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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
State Rice Milling Company, Incorporated.0 Contracts for the
sale of rice for delivery to the buyer in this country were in-
volved. When the buyer's license was revoked and its establish-
ment sequestered by the government as the property of an enemy
alien at the outbreak of the war with Japan, the Louisiana seller
immediately notified the buyer that the contracts were cancelled.
This was sustained by the court under the common law doctrine
of frustration on the ground that the action would have been taken
by a prudent business man in view of all of the information the
seller had before it at the time indicating that the business effi-
cacy or value of the contract had been materially impaired. The
evidence showed that about twenty-four days later the plaintiff
was given a limited license. The seller's action appears to have
been somewhat hasty, but perhaps the court was correct in not
requiring too nice a degree of deliberation in view of the situa-
tion existing on and after December 7, 1941.
PERSONS
Robert A. Pascal*
Parish jurisdiction for divorce or separation. Section 301 of
Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, providing for divorce
after a two year separation in fact, states that the plaintiff "may
sue, in the courts of his or her residence within this state." In
Wreyford v. Wreyford' the plaintiff wife, described as a "resident
of Caddo Parish," filed suit in Red River Parish, in which she and
her husband had been domiciled while living together and in
which the husband was still domiciled at the time of the suit. In
the words of the court, quoted because of their extreme impor-
tance:
"The sole question before us is whether a plaintiff, whose
cause of action is predicated on the ground established by
the aforesaid act of the Legislature, must initiate his (her)
suit in the court of his (her) residence; or, whether that
plaintiff has a choice of instituting suit in the court of his
(her) residence, with the alternative choice of initiating suit
in the court of the defendant's domicile (which would be the
proper forum for a personal action) or in the court of the
matrimonial domicile (which would have jurisdiction of
the res)."
10. 215 La. 1086, 42 So. 2d 855 (1949).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 216 La. 784, 44 So. 2d 867 (1950).
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The majority opinion, written by Justice Moise, concludes as
follows:
"We hold that, where the domicile of the defendant, as well
as the last matrimonial domicile, is in the State of Louisiana,
then the plaintiff has the choice of instituting her action for
divorce at either place, where that action is grounded on
Act No. 430 of 1938, or in accordance with the fiat of the
Legislature, at the forum of her own residence."
Justices Hawthorne and McCaleb dissented on the theory that
the legislation makes it mandatory for the plaintiff to file suit
at his or her "residence."
Three assumptions are found in the majority and the dis-
senting opinions. The first is that the wife may acquire an intra-
state or interparish domicile separate from her husband's. The
second is that there is such a thing in intrastate or internal Loui-
siana law (that is, excluding conflicts law) as "matrimonial
domicile." The third is that the marriage status is a "res" which
can be located at the last intrastate "matrimonial domicile" and
therefore gives that parish a claim to adjudicate in a separation
and divorce suit concerning that marriage. 2
Beginning the discussion with an examination of the second
and third points, it may be observed that the concepts "matri-
monial domicile" and "marriage res" were never warranted or
useful in intrastate matters and, while once useful in interstate
matters, are now obsolete there. During the life of Atherton v.
Atherton as construed by Haddock v. Haddock,3 "matrimonial
domicile" and "marriage res" were important because they per-
mitted a state in which the defendant was neither domiciled nor
personally served to take cognizance of a divorce or separation
suit filed against him with certainty that the judgment rendered
would be entitled to full faith and credit. By treating the mar-
riage as a "res" and locating "it" in the state in which the
spouses last lived together the old "quasi in rem" jurisdictional
doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff4 could be applied, thus obviating the
necessity of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.5
2. These three points were considered In Note, 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
550 (1949) and by the writer In last year's symposium, 10 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 120, 162-164 (1950). The writer believes their importance to be such
as to warrant another discussion in this symposium.
3. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901), and Haddock v. Haddock, 201
U.S. 562 (1906).
4. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
5. The "quasi in rem" divorce theory and therefore the "matrimonial
domicile" and "marriage res" concepts are now obsolete in interstate cases.
1951]
170 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VOL. XI
The "quasi in rem" theory of divorce and separation juris-
diction was never required in intrastate or interparish situations
for two reasons: First, any of the courts in the state with com-
petence in the kind of case may entertain suit against any person
served in or domiciled in that parish, though if the person be
domiciled in another parish in this state he has the right to
demand that he be sued in that parish.6 Second, in interstate
cases the matter is one of legislative as well as of judicial com-
petence, but in intrastate or interparish cases the same legis-
lative authority and law prevails, that of the state. In intrastate
cases, therefore, there is no reason why a separation or divorce
suit cannot be considered a personal action.
If intrastate separation and divorce suits should be consid-
ered personal actions, then certainly suit may be filed in any
parish of this state, subject (1) to the right of the defendant to
require that he or she be sued at his or her parish of domicile,
and subject further (2) to any exceptions established by the
legislature authorizing or requiring suit in another parish. The
second element, in which is contained the principal question in
the case under discussion, is without juridical importance. The
legislature may prescribe what it will in this field; and if the
legislation is not clear the question is reduced to one of choice
between juridically acceptable interpretations. The first element,
however, suggests the question whether the wife can ever have
a domicile in this state separate from her husband's as long as
he is also domiciled in this state.
Article 39 of the Civil Code, which gives the wife the same
domicile as her husband, does not indicate exceptions. Article
142 of the Civil Code has been interpreted to mean the wife may
have a separate domicile,7 but whether this interpretation is right
or wrong, the case dealt with by the article restricts this interpre-
Under Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) legislative and judicial
competence in separation and divorce cases is established by the fact of
domicile of either party in the state. The theory, of course, is that the state
in which a person is domiciled has enough interest in his personal status to
warrant its legislative and judicial authority, that is, the application of its
laws by its courts.
The obsolescence of "matrimonial domicile" and "marriage res" make
regrettable their use in Latham v. Latham, 216 La. 791, 44 So. 2d 870 (1950),
a case involving interstate competence. This case is discussed hereafter in
this symposium.
6. Arts. 162, 335, La. Code of Prac. of 1870.
7. Such is the effect of Hyman v. Schlenker, 44 La. Ann. 108, 10 So. 623
(1892). The case dealt with Article 2437, on the separation of property, but
that article and Article 142 were both derived from Act 9 of 1855 and there
can be no doubt that the remarks of the court would apply to Article 142 as
well as Article 2437.
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tation to interstate domicile. Many supreme court decisions
affirm the separate domicile idea, but all these, with the possible
exception of cases based on Revised Statutes Title 9, Section 301,
deal with interstate domicile. If there is any legislative modifica-
tion of Article 39, then, it is in Section 301 of Title 9. The writer
is of the opinion that such an interpretation should not be given
this act. The legislation is too narrow to prescribe a general
exception to the rules on domicile, and in addition the interpre-
tation seems unnecessary in the light of the purpose of the legis-
lation.8 Assuming that the term residence refers to intrastate or
interparish "residence," the special feature of the clause would
seem to be that it permits the plaintiff wife to sue at her "resi-
dence" without the defendant husband being able to require that
he be sued at his domicile. To interpret the word to mean "domi-
cile" could accomplish no more.
From the above analysis the writer is forced to conclude that
(1) the wife may not have an intrastate domicile separate from
her husband's, (2) the concepts "matrimonial domicile" and
"matrimonial res" are without meaning in internal Louisiana
law, and, therefore, (3) the parish of last "matrimonial domi-
cile" does not have any special competency in divorce and sep-
aration cases.
State jurisdiction for divorce or separation. In Walsh v.
Walsh0 and Latham v. Latham judgments of divorce and sep-
aration, respectively, were attacked on the ground that neither
spouse was domiciled in Louisiana at the time of suit. The
assumption must have been that (1) Louisiana law or (2) the
United States Constitution or (3) both require the domicile of
one spouse to be in this state, but the conclusion reached by the
writer renders it unnecessary to consider any but the first of
these possible alternatives.
Louisiana has never enacted any legislation dealing generally
and directly with this subject. The domicile of the parties in
separation or divorce cases was not mentioned in the Civil Codes
of 1808 and 1825. Article 142 of the Civil Code of 1870, however,
allows a wife in some instances to institute suit against her hus-
8. La. R.S. (1950) 9:301 has been interpreted to require the domicile of
the plaintiff in this state. Spratt v. Spratt, 210 La. 370, 27 So. 2d 154 (1946).
The writer feels this interpretation was forced simply to insure that no
divorce would be allowed under the act which would not be entitled to full
faith and credit. Scrutiny of the language of the legislation indicates that
the reference therein was to intrastate "residence."
9. 215 La. 1099, 42 So. 2d 860 (1949).
10. 216 La. 791, 44 So. 2d 870 (1950).
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band domiciled in another state "in the same manner as if they
were domiciliated" in Louisiana. This language assumes that
ordinarily both parties must be domiciled in this state at the
time of the suit. It is also probable that at the time of enactment
of the Civil Code of 1870 the legislature understood and intended
that the suit outlined in Article 142 could be brought even though
neither party was at the time domiciled in this state, for the
possibility of the wife having a separate domicile had not yet
been generally recognized. By 1892, however, the doctrine of a
wife's separate interstate domicile in cases in which the husband
has given her cause for separation had become accepted and the
supreme court interpreted Article 142 to require the domicile of
the plaintiff wife.1 The only other legislation possibly dealing
with the subject is now contained in Section 301 of Title 9 of
the Revised Statutes, originally Act 269 of 1916 as amended by
Act 31 of 1932 and Act 430 of 1938, allowing divorces for separa-
tion in fact. Here the interpretation has been that domicile of the
plaintiff spouse in this state is required.' 2 Summarizing, the rule
seems to be that before a divorce or separation suit may be
brought in this state both parties must be domiciled here unless:
(a) the suit is brought under Article 142 of the Civil Code, in
which case it suffices if the plaintiff wife is domiciled here; or (b)
the suit is brought under Section 301 of Title 9 of the Revised
Statutes, in which case the plaintiff spouse must be domiciled
here.
If the above analysis is correct, then it may be said that the
legislature has never sanctioned the filing of a separation or
divorce suit by a non-domiciliary, whether or not his or her
spouse is domiciled in this state. In addition, the writer cannot
recall any previous decision of the supreme court recognizing
such a suit. On the basis of these observations the case of Walsh
v. Walsh would be correct, for the suit was filed under Section
301 by a Louisiana domiciliary. Latham v. Latham, however,
would be incorrect, for the suit was one for separation on the
ground of abandonment filed by a non-domiciliary husband.
Legislative clarification would be desirable.
Alimony. According to Article 160 of the Civil Code, after
divorce the wife who has not "sufficient means for her mainte-
nance" may in the discretion of the court be allowed alimony
11. Hyman v. Schlenker, 44 La. Ann. 108, 10 So. 623 (1892). See comments
on this case, supra note 6.
12. Spratt v. Spratt, 210 La. 370, 27 So. 2d 154 (1946). See comment on
this case, supra note 7.
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not to exceed one-third of her former husband's income. The
meaning of the quoted words was at issue in Smith v. Smith.13
The essence of the opinion, written by Justice LeBlanc, was that
''means" implies more than income and includes capital assets.
The wife's capital, valued at about $20,000, consisted of one-half
of the community property acquired during marriage and more
particularly of one automobile, several United States Savings
Bonds, and notes bearing interest at two per cent per annum,
all of which yielded her an income of approximately thirty-five
dollars per month. The opinion expressly refrains from giving
any definite rule as to when the divorced wife must be expected
to use her capital assets for her maintenance and leaves this to
the discretion of the court, in accordance with the phraseology
of Article 160. It may be that the liquid character of the wife's
principal assets were an important factor in the actual decision.
The main point, nevertheless, is of the utmost importance, for
it cannot but result in a tendency to decrease the alimony burden
after divorce.
Article 232 of the Civil Code authorizes the reduction or
increase of alimony when the circumstances of the parties
change. The interpretation of this article quite properly has
always been that it permits a change for the future and not an
increase or decrease of arrearages which have accumulated under
a final judgment.14 Any other interpretation would permit the
judgment debtor to question his liability for arrearages every
time the creditor attempted to enforce the judgment in this state
and, of course, other states could refuse to give the judgment
full faith and credit. This interpretation is affirmed in Gehrkin
v. Gehrkin.15
Another aspect of the Gehrkin case requires comment. The
13. 47 So. 2d 32 (La. 1950).
14. The cases which seem to deviate from this rule did not involve finaljudgments, inasmuch as the original judgments were on appeal. Scott v.
Scott, 197 La. 726, 2 So. 2d 193 (1941), and Coney v. Coney, 215 La. 667, 41 So.
2d 497 (1949). The writer is not in agreement with these decisions for the
reasons stated in last year's symposium, 10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 120, 165
(1950).
A third case, Colby v. Colby, 200 La. 321, 7 So. 924 (1942), might, from the
opinion, lead one to believe that the amount due as arrearages was altered,
but the record in the case shows that the second judgment (rendered before
judgment on the merits of the separation suit and based on the same evi-
dence on which the first judgment was based) was given prospective opera-
tion only. Even this, however, is not understandable. Alimony pendente lite
may be an incident to a suit for separation or divorce, but that does not
force the conclusion that the court may reconsider, at any time pendingjudgment on the merits, its previous judgment on the alimony question with-
out a showing that the condition of the parties has changed.
15. 216 La. 950, 45 So. 2d 89 (1950).
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defendant father claimed the wife had "waived" the arrearages
of alimony due her for support of the child. The court, assum-
ing for the purpose of argument that the law allows "a mother
to waive an alimony decree by judgment of court in favor of
her child," found that the evidence did not indicate a waiver.
This was all that was required for the decision, and the language
should not be taken as an indication that the supreme court is of
the opinion that such a waiver is possible. It may be pointed out
(the practice notwithstanding) that nothing in Louisiana legis-
lation authorizes the payment of alimony for a child to anyone
but its legal representative. During marriage and before separa-
tion from bed and board the father would be the representative.
After the death of a parent, separation, or divorce (as in this
case) the tutor would be the representative. Assuming even that
the mother had been recognized as tutrix, it should be clear that
a tutor cannot waive or compromise his ward's just claims. Such
an act would be beyond the scope of administration.
Another case which should be considered in this connection
is Saunier v. Saunier.16 After separation from bed and board, the
wife had been awarded alimony for herself and for the children
in a unit sum without designation of the share of each. On trial
of a rule to show cause why he should not be adjudged in con-
tempt of court for failure to pay the alimony, the husband pleaded
compensation and proved the wife was indebted to him. The
wife, citing Article 2215 of the Civil Code, contended the husband
could not claim compensation as some of the alimony was for a
third person, the child, who would be prejudiced. The supreme
court satisfied itself by saying that the child was not a third per-
son within the meaning of that article. Probably the decision
would not have been the same had the mother as tutrix been
awarded a specific amount of alimony for the child. The infor-
mality of the practice followed by the lower courts, as in this
case, can lead to the prejudice of children.
In Felger v. Doty 7 the supreme court construed Article 160
of the Civil Code so far as it provides that the wife against whom
a divorce has been obtained on the ground of separation in fact
may be entitled to alimony if she has not been at "fault." Accord-
ing to the court,
"the word 'fault' as so used contemplates conduct or substan-
tial acts of commission or omission on the part of the wife,
16. 47 So. 2d 19 (La. 1950).
17. 217 La. 365, 46 So. 2d 300 (1950).
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violative of her marital duties and responsibilities, which
constitute a contributing or a proximate cause of the separa-
tion and continuous living apart, the ground for the divorce."
It is to be hoped that these words will not be taken to mean
anything other than they were probably intended to mean, that
the wife must have given the husband cause for separation from
bed and board as recognized in Article 138 of the Civil Code.
In Cure v. Tobin18 the first section of Act 24 of 1930, now
Title 9, Section 4452 of the Revised Statutes, was again inter-
preted as not excluding the possibility of devolutive appeals on
matters contained in the judgment pronouncing on the merits of
the separation or divorce proceedings, but not bringing into
question the validity of the divorce or separation itself. Cres-
sione v. Millet 9 had decided the issue in a case involving an
appeal from the custody aspects of the judgment. The instant
case involved an appeal on the judgment so far as it related to
the disposition of the community property. 20
CUSTODY
Section 1565 of Title 13 gives juvenile courts jurisdiction in
cases, among others, "of the State of Louisiana in the interest of
children ... brought before the courts as delinquent or neglected
children." Section 1566 defines "neglected child" to include "any
child . . . found destitute, or dependent on the public for sup-
port, or without proper guardianship, or whose home, by reason
of the neglect, cruelty, depravity or indigence of its parents,
guardians, or other persons, is an unfit place for such child. .. "
In State v. Traylor2" the day after the death of child's
maternal grandmother, said to have been its "legal custodian,"
the maternal grandfather filed an affidavit with the juvenile
court alleging the child to be "an abandoned and neglected
child." The facts showed that the child's father had been charged
with its non-support on several occasions and did not desire its
custody, but that three relatives (the grandfather, a paternal
aunt, and a cousin) and another lady whose connection was not
reported did desire to have it. The court considered the child a
"neglected child" within the meaning of Sections 1565 and 1566
18. 47 So. 2d 329 (La. 1950).
19. 212 La. 691, 33 So. 2d 198 (1947).
20. Schneider v. Manion, 217 La. 118, 46 So. 2d 58 (1950), merely and
quite properly applies to appeals in separation and divorce cases the rules
presented by the general legislation for the computation of time for filing
appeals and posting appeal bonds. It requires no discussion.
21. 216 La. 193, 43 So. 2d 469 (1949).
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on the basis that "the legal custodian" of the child had died and
that "the child was left without a legal custodian because the
father did not have custody of it." The juvenile court was there-
fore deemed to have jurisdiction to determine in whose custody
the child should be placed. The writer feels that the decision is
not within the letter or spirit of the above-quoted juvenile court
legislation. The whole tenor of that legislation is to authorize
state intervention in matters relative to children if and when
the child's problem becomes a social one. The proper course of
action in this case would have been a suit to appoint a tutor for
the child. It does not appear from the opinion that the child was
in any danger of neglect or improper influence, except possibly
from the father, and he probably would have been excluded
from the tutorship under Article 305 of the Civil Code for having
failed to support it.
State ex rel. Martin v. Graza22 was a habeas corpus proceed-
ing instituted by a mother to recover custody of her child from
strangers. Finding she had entrusted its care to the strangers
when and for only so long as she was ill and financially unable
to care for it herself, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's
award to the mother.2 3 The respondents had also challenged the
jurisdiction of the district court on the ground that the juvenile
court of the parish had already obtained "custody" of the child
in adoption proceedings which were pending before the juvenile
court at the time the habeas corpus proceedings were instituted.
The adoption proceedings, however, had been dismissed before
consideration of the writ on its merits, and hence there could be
no question of the right of the district court to proceed with the
case. The district court has been said not to have jurisdiction in
cases in which the juvenile court already has pending before it
a matter concerning the custody of the child2 4 but the supreme
court has also permitted the district court to retain jurisdiction
where the lack of the juvenile court's jurisdiction in the matter
pending before it has been demonstrated to the district court. 25
PROOF OF PATERNITY
Damman v. Viada26 is interesting only as an attempt to prove
paternity under Article 210 of the Civil Code. That article pro-
22. 217 La. 532, 46 So. 2d 760 (1950).
23. The case may be compared with State ex rel. Martin v. Talbot, 161
La. 192, 108 So. 411 (1926) and State ex rel. Guinn v. Watson, 210 La. 265, 26
So. 2d 740 (1946).
24. State ex rel. Terry v. Nugent, 212 La. 382, 31 So. 2d 834 (1947).
25. State ex rel. Simpson v. Salter, 211 La. 918, 31 So. 2d 163 (1947).
26. 216 La. 1087, 45 So. 2d 632 (1950).
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vides that the oath of the mother naming the father is sufficient
to prove paternal descent unless she is "known as a woman of
dissolute manners, or as having had an unlawful connection with
one or more men (other than the man whom she declares to be
the father of the Child)." Although letters from the alleged
father contained language "indicating that there might have been
an improper relationship" between him and the mother, the
court concluded that there was no proof of cohabitation between
them. The issue is one of fact only and need not be discussed
further. The opinion, however, left the writer with the impres-
sion that the lack of probative value assigned the defendant's
letter may have been attributable at least in part to reluctance to
consider paternity as proved without a clear admission to this
effect on the part of the alleged father.
INTERDICTION
Article 391 of the Civil Code, as amended by Act 231 of 1948,
provides for the appointment of an attorney at law to represent
the defendant in proceedings for interdiction if he "though domi-
ciled in this state, shall be confined, because of his disease, in a
public or private institution without this state." The Interdiction
of Toca 27 was just such a case. In 1930 the defendant, while domi-
ciled here, but attending school outside this state, was there judi-
cially determined to be of unsound mind and committed to an
institution. He was still there at the time interdiction proceedings
were begun in this state. The court, through Justice Ponder,
decided that the legislation should be given "practical applica-
tion" and not interpreted to cover a case in which the defendant
had been a charge of another jurisdiction for nineteen years. The
legislature, according to the court, could not have intended "that
this statute should apply to anyone except those temporarily
absent from the state." The decision is obviously contrary to the
legislation and unjustifiable.
The idea that the state should not take cognizance of inter-
diction proceedings if the defendant is not physically present in
the state may suggest the confusion of interdiction with confine-
ment. In the latter case (ignoring the problem of enforcement)
it would seem to be the better policy to have the defendant
present in court or at least observable within the area in which
the court sits. Interdiction, however, does not in any way neces-
sarily involve confinement. The principal effects of interdiction
27. 217 La. 465, 46 So. 2d 737 (1950).
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proper are to deprive an insane or otherwise incapable individual
of the care and management of his affairs for his own good and
to make possible the appointment of a curator to administer the
estate. In the instant case there can be little doubt that the
defendant had some interests in this state requiring administra-
tion, otherwise the petition for interdiction probably would not
have been filed. And there can hardly be better evidence of the
inability to care for one's affairs than mental unsoundness justi-
fying actual commitment for over nineteen years.
The writer will go so far as to say that in his opinion neither
domicile nor presence is essential to the legislative and judicial
competence of this state in interdiction cases if the person has
interests in this state which need administration. Even Article
392 of the Civil Code, which states "Every interdiction shall be
pronounced by the competent judge of the domicile or residence
of the person to be interdicted," would seem to refer to intrastate
or interparish domicile or residence, and therefore to venue
rather than to jurisdiction. If the person is not domiciled or resid-




There have been many instances in which a Louisiana land-
owner conveys or grants a right-of-way across his property, but
the so-called "right-of-way" does not per se identify fully the
relationship or the rights of the parties. This uncertainty results
from the failure of the parties to realize or to specify whether
the transaction is a transfer of ownership or the establishment
of a servitude. In the absence of a clearly expressed intent to
transfer ownership of the strip of land, the court has treated the
right-of-way as a servitude. Accordingly, in Bonnabel v. Police
Jury, Parish of Jefferson1 the court held that the right-of-way
was a servitude and had been extinguished by the prescription
of ten years non-use, even where the deed used the following
language: "sell, transfer, convey, assign, set over and deliver...
a right-of-way ... which right-of-way is hereby conveyed, trans-
ferred, assigned and delivered unto said grantee . . . in per-
petuity to have and retain the absolute title to same ..
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 216 La. 798, 44 So. 2d 872 (1950).
[VOL. XI
